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Abstract
This chapter is the introduction to the book Nudge and the Law: A European
Perspective. It sets the scene for an exploration of the legal implications of the
emergent phenomenon of behaviourally informed intervention. More precisely,
we focuses on the challenges and opportunities it may offer to the policymaking
of the European Union. This dual focus on law and on Europe characterises our
endeavour. We take as our starting point the current debate around "Nudging",
which mainly comprises two strands of enquiry: when is it legitimate for States
to use psychology to inform policy? (the legitimacy debate) and, to the extent
that it is legitimate, how can behavioural insights in practice be incorporated into
the decision making processes? (the practicability debate). We explain why a
European perspective differs somewhat from a US American perspective and
introduce the structure of the volume.
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Policy-Making: A European 
Perspective 
 ANNE-LISE  SIBONY  AND  ALBERTO  ALEMANNO 
 N UDGE AND THE Law explores the legal implications of the emergent phenomenon of behaviourally informed intervention. It focuses on the challenges and opportunities it may offer to the policy-making of the 
European Union (hereinafter, EU). This dual focus on law and on Europe char-
acterises our endeavour. Like many readers around the globe, we discovered with 
appetite and excitement the books that initially brought the basics of behavioural 
sciences to a wider audience. 1 Several books later, while the new accessibility of 
behavioural insights has inspired both theoretical and applied work on  behavioural 
economics and policy-making, relatively little attention has been given to the legal 
 dimension. 2 This is what this book focuses on. 
 For any degree of precision to be achieved, legal implications of a phenomenon 
need to be studied within a legal system — or several if a comparative approach is 
chosen. In this regard, our focus is on the European Union, both because, as EU 
legal scholars, this was something we could do and, more importantly, because 
the European dimension has to date been largely absent from the conversation on 
behaviourally-inspired policy-making. 
 Part I of this chapter sets the scene for the volume by providing a legal per-
spective on nudging and, more broadly, on behaviourally-informed intervention. 
 1  RH  Thaler and  CR  Sunstein ,  Nudge:  Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness ( New 
Haven ,  Yale University Press ,  2008 ) ;  D  Ariely ,  Predictably Irrational:  The Hidden Forces that Shape Our 
Decisions ( New York ,  Harper Collins ,  2008 ) ;  S  Levitt and  S  Dubner ,  Freakonomics:  A Rogue  Economist 
Explores the Hidden Side of Everything ( New York ,  William Morrow ,  2005 ) ;  D  Kahneman ,  Thinking Fast 
and Slow ( New York ,  Farrar ,  Straus and Giroux ,  2011 ) ;  MH  Bazerman and  AE  Tenbrunsel ,  Blind Spots: 
 Why We Fail to Do What ’ s Right and What to Do about It ( Princeton ,  Princeton University Press ,  2011 ) . 
 2  To mention only books:  E  Shafi r (ed),  The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy ( Princeton , 
 Princeton University Press ,  2012 ) ;  R  Jones ,  J  Pykett and  M  Whitehead ,  Changing Behaviours — On 
the Rise of the Psychological State ( Cheltenham ,  Edward Elgar ,  2013 ) : as an emerging approach to 
 behavioural government;  A  Oliver ,  Behavioural Public Policy ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press , 
 2013 ) ; and, from a literary perspective,  D  Brooks ,  The Social Animal ( New York ,  Random House ,  2011 ) . 
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It explores if, when and how behavioural insights can be accommodated in the 
legal system. Part II defi nes the scope of our editorial project and explains why 
it makes sense to adopt a singularly European perspective. Part III sets out the 
methodology chosen in editing this volume and outlines the content of the book. 
 I. NUDGE AND THE LAW 
 A. The Universal Appeal of Behaviourally Informed Intervention 
 Following the successful publication of several of books popularising the major 
fi ndings of behavioural sciences, the observation that people make imperfect deci-
sions has become mainstream and, today, almost a truism. 3 The general public 
but also, in several countries, policymakers have become increasingly aware of 
key insights from behavioural sciences. A behavioural approach can provide new 
explanations for the many limits of conventional policy-making that is based on 
neoclassical assumptions of rationality. As such, it is set to reveal that many prem-
ises policymakers and courts have taken for granted over time cannot survive the 
test of empirical scrutiny. The potential of behavioural teachings to help improve 
policy design appears intuitive and explains increasing interest in policy circles. 4 
 The global appeal of behaviourally informed intervention has largely to do with 
its being presented as  ‘ nudging ’ , that is designing  ‘ any aspect of the choice archi-
tecture that alters people ’ s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any 
options or signifi cantly changing their economic incentives ’ . 5 First of all, nudging 
is presented as a cheap and smart alternative to expensive traditional regulatory 
measures. 6 Indeed, the fact that behaviourally savvy intervention does not always 
require legislation is sometimes presented as one of its attractive features for 
 governments. 7 Even when it is not used as an alternative to but in combination with 
traditional legal tools, such as fi nes, behaviourally informed intervention can still 
represent a cheap alternative, not to law, but to costly enforcement  mechanisms. 8 
This is due to the fact that leveraging behavioural traits ensures a higher rate of 
 3  For a critical, yet minority, view denying the inherent shortcomings of human cognitive function, 
see  G  Gigerenzer ,  Risk Savvy:  How to Make Good Decisions ( New York ,  Penguin Group ,  2014 ) . 
 4  See, eg  P  Lunn ,  Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics ( Paris ,  OECD ,  2014 ) . In November 
2014, the UK Behavioural Insights Team successfully raised awareness about behavioural insights at 
the World Economic Forum by setting up a new initiative under the lead of David Halpern and Eldar 
Shafi r. 
 5  Thaler and Sunstein (n 1) 6. 
 6  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Empirically Informed Regulation ’ ( 2011 )  78  University of Chicago Law Review  1349 ; 
 K  Yeung ,  ‘ Nudge as a Fudge ’ ( 2012 )  75  MLR  122 . 
 7  T  Marteau et al,  ‘ Judging Nudging :  Can Nudging Improve Population Health? ’ ( 2011 )  342  British 
Medical Journal d228 , cited in  P  Rainford and  J  Tinkler ,  Designing for Nudge Effects: How Behaviour 
Management can Ease Public Sector Problems ( 2011 ) available at: eprints.lse.ac.uk/37810/. 
 8  A  Alemanno and  A  Spina ,  ‘ Nudging Legally :  On the Checks and Balances of Behavioural  Regulation ’ 
( 2014 )  12  International Journal of Constitutional Law  2 . 
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voluntary compliance. 9 Second, nudging promises to be choice-preserving, by 
always enabling the addressee to opt out of the preferred policy option. 10 Third, in 
specifi c areas, regulation needs to become behaviourally informed not to  ‘ nudge ’ 
citizens but to offer a  ‘ counter-nudging ’ force against the exploitative use of behav-
ioural insights by market actors. As illustrated in chapter seven by Alessandro 
Spina and Eoin Carolan, businesses, in particular the new actors of the digital 
economy, are using behaviourally informed strategies to steer consumer choices. 11 
The perceived manipulative character of some marketing practices prompts calls 
for regulation, but such intervention can only aptly address citizens ’ concerns if 
it is based on a sound understanding of how behaviour is infl uenced. 12 
 B. Behavioural Insights in a Nutshell 
 The central fi ndings of behavioural research that are of interest to policy-making 
may be summarised in four statements: 13 i) humans display a tendency to inertia 
and procrastination; ii) they are very sensitive to how information is presented 
(framing); iii) as well as to social infl uences; and iv) humans do not handle prob-
abilities very well. 
 Inertia refers to the natural propensity of humans to accept their environment 
(including, eg their current mobile phone plan) as a given rather than take affi rm-
ative choices to change it, even when it would be in their best interest to do so and 
even when it could be done fairly easily. In other words, small hurdles matter a lot. 
 9  eg an experiment conducted in the UK showed that our sensitivity to being addressed by our 
own name (a behavioural trait that seems to be almost universally shared) could be leveraged to save 
collection costs of court fi nes. An experiment compared the effectiveness of reminders sent by mail 
and by text messages, as well as several variations in the text of the reminder. Text messages proved 
more effective than letters and messages containing the name of the addressee worked best. The con-
clusion was that, if scaled on a national basis, texting personalised reminders would increase revenues 
from fi nes by  £ 30 million and save the cost of 150,000 bailiff interventions annually (L Haynes et al, 
 ‘ Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy with Randomised Controlled Trials ’ (Cabinet Offi ce and 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2012) 10 available at:  www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/fi le/62529/TLA-1906126.pdf ). 
 10  This claim is found, eg in  C  Jolls and  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Debiasing through Law ’ ( 2006 )  35  Journal of 
Legal Studies  199, 202 . This  ‘ pre-commitment to regulatory tools that preserve choice ’ , has been pin-
pointed as its major weakness by  R  Bubb and  R  Pildes ,  ‘ How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and 
Why ’ ( 2014 )  127  Harvard Law Review . Baldwin, for his part, points out that not all nudges do in fact 
preserve meaningful choices.  ‘ Nudges of the third degree ’ , which he defi nes as those that shape deci-
sions and preferences in a manner that is  ‘ resistant to unpacking ’ (by System 2), do not in fact, leave a 
realistic possibility to resist to the nudge.  R  Baldwin ,  ‘ From Regulation to Behaviour Change :  Giving 
Nudge the Third Degree ’ ( 2014 )  77  MLR  831, 836 . 
 11  For an insightful perspective on  ‘ digital nudging ’ , see  R  Calo ,  ‘ Digital Market Manipulation ’ 
( 2014 )  82 ( 4 )  George Washington Law Review  995 – 1051 and, in this volume,  ch 8 on  ‘ Behavioural 
Sciences and the Regulation of Privacy on the Internet ’ by FZ Borgesius. 
 12  See  ch 7 by A Spina and E Carolan and  ch 8 by FZ Borgesius. 
 13  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Empirically Informed Regulation ’ ( 2011 )  78  University of Chicago Law Review  1349 . 
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One consequence is that people strongly tend to stick to the default option, which, 
in some cases, is set by law 14 or otherwise regulated. 
 The term  ‘ framing effects ’ captures the fact that choices do not depend solely on 
the content and properties of the options subjects face but also, crucially, of the 
way in which they are framed. 15 For instance, test subjects are more likely to opt 
for surgery if told that the  ‘ survival ’ rate is 90 per cent, than if they are informed 
that the mortality rate is 10 per cent. 
 ‘ Social infl uence ’ expresses how our preferences are not only context-dependent 
but also shaped by the behaviour of others. This trait not only makes us prefer 
a full over an empty restaurant, it can also be leveraged in the legal sphere. For 
example, reminders for late tax payers may be drafted in such a way as to appeal 
to a social norm by indicating the proportion of taxpayers in a similar situation in 
the same locality who have already paid their taxes. 16 
 Meanwhile, probability neglect refers to our tendency to completely disregard 
probabilities when making a decision under conditions of uncertainty. This ten-
dency has obvious impact, for example, on fi nancial choices people make and, 
consequently, is relevant for consumer protection in the area of fi nancial services. 17 
 What these insights collectively suggest is that cognitive and attentional limita-
tions, the social environment and prevailing social norms matter for individual 
choices. 18 They are not only relevant to understand behaviour, which is the perspec-
tive of science, but also to regulate behaviour, which is the perspective of law. 19 If we 
 14  An example is organ donation. Where the law provides that consent is presumed (is the default), 
the proportion of donors in the population is much higher than where people have to sign up to a 
donors register. For a discussion, see  ch 3 by M Quigley and E Strokes. Legal defaults are not always 
sticky:  LE  Willis ,  ‘ When Nudges Fail :  Slippery Defaults ’ ( 2013 )  80  University of Chicago Law Review 
 1115 . 
 15  A  Tversky and  D  Kahneman ,  ‘ The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice ’ ( 1981 ) 
 211  Science  453 . 
 16  An experiment run in the UK has shown that such a move achieves savings in collection costs: 
Behavioural Insights Team,  ‘ Annual Update ’ (2010 – 11) 15 – 16,  www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/fi le/60537/Behaviour-Change-Insight-Team-Annual-Update_acc.pdf . 
 17  The Financial Conduct Authority in the UK has been investigating how to use behavioural 
insights. See  K  Erta et al,  ‘ Applying Behavioural Economics at the Financial Conduct Authority ’ 
Financial  Conduct Authority (UK) ( 2013 ) 1 Occasional Paper,  www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/
occasional-papers/occasional-paper-1.pdf . For an analysis of EU Financial Services regulation, see 
in this volume  ch 11 by P Van Cleynenbreugel,  ‘ Conduct of Business Rules in EU Financial Services 
 Regulation: Behavioural Rules Devoid of Behavioural Analysis? ’ . 
 18  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Nudges.gov :  Behavioural Economics and Regulation ’ in  E  Zamir and  D  Teichman 
(eds),  Oxford Handbook of Behavioural Economics and the Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press , 
 forthcoming) ;  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Empirically Informed Regulation ’ ( 2011 )  78  University of Chicago Law 
Review  1349 . 
 19  For a US perspective see, eg  M  Vandebergh ,  A  Carrico , and  L  Schultz ,  ‘ Regulation in the  Behavioral 
Era ’ ( 2011 )  95  Minnesota Law Review  715 . For an EU approach, see  E  Ciriolo ,  ‘ Behavioral Econom-
ics at the European Commission :  Past, Present and Future ’ [ 2011 ]  Oxera Agenda  1 ;  A  Alemanno 
et al,  ‘ Nudging Healthy Lifestyles — Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioural Research ’ 
( 2012 )  3  European Journal of Risk Regulation  3 . For an OECD perspective,  ‘ Consumer Policy Toolkit ’ 
 available at  www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/consumerpolicytoolkit.htm . For a contract law perspective, 
see  O  Bar-Gill ,  Seduction by Contract, Law Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets ( Oxford , 
 Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) ; for a public health law perspective,  A  Alemanno ,  ‘ Informing the 
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want to regulate the behaviour of humans who populate the real world rather than 
the behaviour of econs who inhabit econland, it makes sense to take into considera-
tion how the former are known to operate. It is a matter of  effectiveness: if the law 
operates on an inaccurate model for the behaviour it seeks to regulate (eg investment 
choices), it is likely to miss its target. 20 For example, rather than making it mandatory 
for fi rms to provide all the information theoretically needed to enable rational and 
informed choice, it seems preferable to make sure that consumers receive meaning-
ful information: less information but presented in a way that is easier to process, so 
that it is less likely that they ignore it altogether. 21 In the constant search for increased 
effectiveness, lawmakers have every reason to be allured by behavioural science. 22 To 
go from promises to practice, it is necessary to take a look at the behavioural toolbox, 
but because legal tools are made of words, some clarifi cations about the language we 
use to speak about nudging and related endeavours should come fi rst. 
 C. Labelling: Do You Speak Nudgese? 
 Due to its popularising intent and resulting appeal,  ‘ nudge ’ is by far the most fre-
quent term used to refer to behaviourally inspired intervention. Despite its domi-
nating effect on the behavioural discourse, the concept presents two signifi cant 
shortcomings. First, its normative identity is far from clear — as recognised by its 
creators themselves. 23 Second, it fails to capture the entire reality of behavioural 
action. In any event, empirically informed intervention, even though it is indiffer-
ently referred to as nudging, behaviourally informed regulation or evidence-based 
policy-making, consists essentially in the application of behavioural insights to 
policy-making. 24 However, different names carry different meanings and several 
concepts lie behind this semantic variety. 25 
Non-Communicable Diseases Agenda with Behavioural Insights ’ in  A  Alemanno and  A  Garde (eds), 
 Regulating Lifestyles — Europe, Alcohol, Tobacco and Unhealthy Diets ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge Univer-
sity Press ,  2015 ) . For an international law perspective,  T  Broude ,  ‘ Behavioral International Law ’ ( 2013 ) 
 12 – 13 Hebrew University of Jerusalem International Law Forum Research Paper, available at ssrn.com/
abstract=2320375. 
 20  A  Tor ,  ‘ The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law ’ ( 2008 )  4  Haifa Law Review  237, 241 . 
 21  For a discussion of information requirement in the context of EU consumer law, see  O  Bar-Gill 
and  O  Ben-Shahar ,  ‘ Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection :  A Critique of European Con-
sumer Contract Law ’ ( 2013 )  50  CML Rev  109 . More generally, see  O  Ben Shahar and  CE  Schneider , 
 More than You Wanted to Know:  The Failure of Mandated Disclosure ( Princeton ,  Princeton University 
Press ,  2014 ) and, for a more scholarly version of the argument,  O  Ben Shahar and  C  Schneider ,  ‘ The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure ’ ( 2010 )  159  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  647 . 
 22  We borrow this apt characterisation from Robin Feldman, who writes more generally about the 
 ‘ allure of science ’ :  R  Feldman ,  The Role of Science in Law ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2009 )  3 . 
 23  The same co-promoter of  ‘ nudge ’ thinking seems to have recently recognised this point. See, 
 C  Sunstein ,  ‘ It ’ s for your Own Good ’ , Book Review of Sarah Conly ’ s  Against Autonomy ,  The New York 
Review of Books , April  2013 . 
 24  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Empirically Informed Regulation ’ ( 2011 )  78  University of Chicago law Review  1349 . 
 25  For a valuable effort at unpacking the various concepts embedded in the notion of nudging, see 
R Baldwin (n 10). 
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 Labelling is also a highly contextual exercise. Often, when a discussion is 
imported from the US to Europe, the US terminology travels along. Yet, as is well 
known in the study of transplants, the way in which an institution or a discourse 
takes shape is context-dependant. 26 This also applies to labels for behaviourally 
informed government action as well as to academic labels applied to the study of 
such action. US names may or may not fi t European realities. 
 i. Labelling Matters 
 Despite the limited scholarship triggered by the behavioural turn of regulation, 
EU scholars seem particularly interested in questions of characterisation revolv-
ing around behavioural government action. Thus, their publications engage with 
defi nitional issues aimed at characterising the precise boundaries of behavioural 
action and its relationship with the nudge movement. 27 
 From a European perspective, this interest in characterisation and defi nitional 
issues seems surprising because — unlike in the US — these labelling questions do 
not carry legal consequences. In the US, deciding whether graphic visual warnings 
on cigarettes must be considered mere  ‘ information ’ (telling consumers about the 
adverse effects stemming from tobacco) or a  ‘ nudge ’ (aimed at changing behav-
iour) determines their legality. 28 The warnings are valid if they qualify as  ‘ notice ’ , 
by virtue of a carve-out to the usual scrutiny to which coerced speech is subject 
under the First Amendment, but they become invalid if they qualify as a nudge. 29 
This bifurcated approach has been severely criticised 30 in light of recent research 
showing that emotional communication does not bypass the cognitive system. 31 
Simply because communication is non-verbal does not imply that the adressee will 
be unable to make a reasoned decision. While in Europe, there is also a sentiment 
that bypassing the cognitive system of citizens poses a problem, there is no reason 
to think that this US legal development could be replicated in Europe. In the EU 
 26  A  Watson ,  Legal Transplants ( Edinburgh ,  1974 ) . In the context of management practices: 
 GS  Drori ,  MA  H ö llerer , and  P  Walgenbach (eds),  Global Themes and Local Variations in Organization 
and Management:  Perspectives on Glocalization ( London ,  Routledge ,  2013 ) . 
 27  See, eg  L  Bovens ,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ in  T  Gr ü ne-Yanoff and  SO  Hansson (eds),  Preference 
Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology ( New York ,  Springer ,  2008 )  207 ; and  R 
 Jones ,  J  Pykett , and  M  Whitehead ,  Changing Behaviours — On the Rise of the Psychological State ( Edward 
Elgar ,  2013 )  163 et seq. 
 28  See, eg  EP  Goodman ,  ‘ Visual Gut Punch :  Persuasion, Emotion and the Constitutional 
 Meaning of Graphic Disclosure ’ ( 2014 )  99  Cornell Law Review ;  R  Calo ,  ‘ Code, Nudge or Notice? ’ 
( 2013 ) 2013-04 University of Washington Research Paper, available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2217013. 
 29  RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co v FDA ,  696 F 3d 1205, 1221 – 22 (DC Circuit  2012 ) . 
 30  Goodman (n 25). See also  R  Tushnet ,  ‘ More than a Feeling :  Emotion and the First Amendment ’ 
( 2014 )  127  Harvard Law Review  2392 . 
 31  For a perspective on contemporary theory of emotions see, eg  GL  Clore and  M  Tamir ,  ‘ Affects 
as Embodied Information ’ ( 2007 )  13 ( 1 )  Psychology Inquiry  37 . For a philosophical enquiry into the 
nature of emotions, see  M  Nussbaum ,  Upheavals of Thought:  The Intelligence of Emotions ( Cambridge , 
 Cambridge University Press ,  2003 ) (who argues that emotions are built on  ‘ cognitive appraisal or 
evaluations ’ ). 
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legal order, it is not clear to what extent characterisation of  behaviourally-inspired 
public action may engender divergent legal consequences. 32 
 ii. Labels for Government Action 
 As mentioned,  ‘ nudging ’ is the most widely used label for government action, 
but it is slightly misleading because it describes only one form of behaviourally 
informed public action. Nudge presents two defi ning features: fi rst, the authority 
preserves free choice by not preventing the selection of presumably suboptimal 
options, and, second, behavioural insights are used to alter the choice architec-
ture so as to make preferred decisions more likely. 33 Acting as  ‘ choice architects ’ , 
policymakers organise the context, process and environment in which individuals 
make decisions. 34 Nudge is therefore presented as a distinctive, alternative way, 
characterised as being minimally burdensome, low-cost and choice-preserving, to 
help promote regulatory goals. 35 
 However, neither this notion nor the legal instruments best suited to imple-
ment governmental nudges have received much attention in the legal commu-
nity. Thus, for instance, it is not clear whether a nudge may be embedded into 
the law. Equally, it is ambiguous whether the mere provision of information or 
incentives can qualify as nudges 36 (in principle, according to the original defi ni-
tion the former should but the latter should not). 37 It is even less clear whether 
the growing interest in nudging may trigger the enactment of more regulation 38 
or whether it should rather be construed as the continuation of a deregulatory 
agenda. 39 Because of its uncertain contours and because it cuts across many dif-
ferent legal categories,  ‘ nudge ’ is not a notion that lends itself easily to integration 
in the  language of the law or legal scholarship. 40 
 32  A  Alemanno and  A  Spina ,  ‘ On the Checks and Balances of Behavioural Regulation ’ ( 2014 )  12 
 International Journal of Constitutional Law  429 . 
 33  Thaler and Sunstein,  Nudg e (n 1); Ariely,  Predictably Irrational (n 1).  CR  Sunstein ,  Simpler, The 
Future of Government ( New York ,  Simon  & Schuster ,  2013 )  39 . See also, eg  J  Baron ,  Thinking and 
 Deciding ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge University Press ,  2007 ) . 
 34  ibid. 
 35  Thaler and Sunstein,  Nudge (n 1). 
 36  For an introduction to the debate about what qualifi es as a nudge, see  L  Bovens ,  ‘ The Ethics of 
Nudge ’ in  T  Gr ü ne-Yanoff and  SO  Hansson (eds),  Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Eco-
nomics and Psychology ( New York ,  Springer ,  2008 )  207 . 
 37  Sunstein,  Simpler (n 333) 39. 
 38  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Nudges.gov :  Behavioural Economics and Regulation ’ in  E  Zamir and  D  Teichman 
(eds),  Oxford Handbook of Behavioural Economics and the Law ( Oxford University Press , forthcoming)  9 . 
 39  About his time as the head of the Offi ce of Informationa and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),  Sunstein 
writes  ‘ We were not only focussed on issuing smart regulation. We were focused on deregulation 
too ’ , Sunstein,  Simpler (n 333) 8. Similarly, in the UK, the Behavioural Insights Unit was set up by 
David  Cameron as a step in the pursuit of a deregulation agenda. See David Halpern (head of Nudge 
Unit):  ‘ We try to avoid legislation and ordering ’  The Guardian , 5 February 2013, theguardian.com/
society/2013/feb/05/david-halpern-government-nudge-unit. 
 40  The same co-promoter of  ‘ nudge ’ thinking seems to have recently recognised this point. See, 
 C  Sunstein ,  ‘ It ’ s for Your Own Good ’ , Book Review of Sarah Conly ’ s  Against Autonomy ,  The New York 
Review of Books , April  2013 . 
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 In addition, even if it could be legally defi ned, nudging is — as previously 
illustrated — only one of several possible approaches available to incorporate 
behavioural insights into policy-making. Yet, current language use seems to have 
selected this word as the most appealing shorthand for behaviourally informed 
rulemaking. 41 In light of this fact, we chose to use  ‘ nudge ’ in the title of this 
 volume, although we note that this cannot (and should not) subsume the broader 
phenomenon of use of behavioural sciences in law. 
 iii. Labels for Academic Endeavours 
 From a descriptive point of view,  ‘ law and psychology ’ would probably be the 
most accurate name for the study of whether law should incorporate fi ndings 
from cognitive and social psychology and how it could do so. 42 The reason why 
this label has not prevailed in the US seems to be twofold. First, it was already 
taken. To those for whom the phrase  ‘ law and psychology ’ is familiar, it is asso-
ciated with studies focussing mainly on psychology of judges, jurors, witnesses, 
and  criminals. 43 The legal implications of psychological traits that play out in the 
decisions of citizens, consumers, investors or corporate board members are not 
part of the fi eld. This argument has much less weight in continental Europe than 
in the US or the UK, because most continental legal scholars are not aware of law 
and psychology studies. The time lag between the EU and in the US is the more 
weighty reason to not go for the label  ‘ law and psychology ’ as it would not do a 
service to the incipient European research on law and decision-making research 
(to use a hopefully neutral label) to give it a name that US scholars would almost 
certainly misunderstand. 
 The second reason why  ‘ law and psychology ’ has not picked up in the US as 
a general label for interdisciplinary legal scholarship relying on psychological 
insights is that there was a powerful incentive to call the new fi eld another name. 
 ‘ Behavioural law and economics ’ 44 had the advantage that it clearly presented the 
scholarly innovation as a competitive entry on the market dominated by law and 
 41  Baldwin (n 10), makes the same statement although he seems to also object to widespread usage. 
 42  For a thorough discussion in the US context, see  J  Rachlinski ,  ‘ New Law and Psychology ’ ( 2000 ) 
 85  Cornell Law Review  739 . 
 43  A relatively broad description of the fi eld found on the Stanford Law School website lists  ‘ Con-
fl ict resolution and negotiation; judgment and decision-making capacity; prejudice and stereotyping; 
criminal responsibility; competency; assessment of evidence, including the reliability of eyewitnesses, 
and lie detection; hedonics; developmental psychology and educational policy; addiction and drug 
policy ’ ( www.law.stanford.edu/degrees/joint-degrees/law-and-psychology ). 
 44  See, eg  C  Jolls et al,  ‘ A Behavioural Approach to Law and Economics ’ ( 1998 )  50  Stanford Law 
Review  1471 ;  C  Jolls ,  ‘ Governing America :  The Emergence of Behavioural Law and Economics ’ Max 
Weber Lecture Series,  2010 /3 ;  R  Bubb and  R  Pildes ,  ‘ How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why ’ 
( 2014 )  127  Harvard Law Review  1593 . In the EU context:  H  Luth ,  Behavioural Economics in  Consumer 
Policy:  The Economic Analysis of Standard Terms in Consumer Contracts Revisited  ( Antwerpen ,  Intersen-
tia ,  2010 ) ;  M  Lissowska ,  ‘ Overview of Behavioural Economics Elements in the OECD Consumer Policy 
Toolkit ’ ( 2011 )  34  Journal of Consumer Policy  393 ;  P  Lunn ,  Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics 
( Paris ,  OECD ,  2014 ) . 
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economics. The publicity was worth the irony. It is indeed a little ironic that, after 
having embraced the rationality hypothesis for about fi ve decades as a matter of 
disciplinary identity, economics should appear as the discipline that brings behav-
ioural wisdom to the study of law. As Daniel Kahneman writes,  ‘ Labels matter, 
and the mislabelling of applied behavioural sciences as behavioural economics 
has consequences ’ . 45 The consequences Kahneman points to are, fi rst, that  ‘ impor-
tant contributions of psychology to public policy are not recognized as such ’ and, 
 second, that this unfairness drives young psychologists away from applied research 
that could be useful to policy-making. 46 
 From a legal scholar ’ s perspective, this state of affairs is regrettable because it 
makes more sense to draw directly from empirical psychology studies rather than 
to take the detour via the selection of psychological insights labelled behavioural 
economics. It amounts to using a fi lter that was designed to retain what psychol-
ogy could offer to a discussion internal to the discipline of economics, when there 
is no reason to believe that this fi lter is suited to legal needs. 
 ‘ Behavioural analysis of law ’ 47 has the advantage of avoiding the unwelcome, 
US-centric reference to economics and is, for this reason alone, preferable. Yet, it 
suffers from a different inaccuracy. It is not the law that is analysed with the tools 
of behavioural sciences. Rather it is human behaviour (ie facts, not law) that is 
scrutinised in light of behavioural concepts (stemming from psychology). This 
imprecision is acceptable because the name works well in the US due to the anal-
ogy with the familiar  ‘ economic analysis of law ’ . Again, the trade-off between accu-
racy and catchiness is different in Europe. 
 We prefer  ‘ law and behavioural sciences ’ because it is ideologically neutral and 
descriptively accurate. It is fully compatible with the notion that the function of 
behavioural sciences may be to shed light on facts (rather than law), leaving it to 
legal analysis to decide whether and how this knowledge about facts could and 
should be incorporated. This name is also less charged with a US-shaped debate 
that neither fi ts the realities of EU scholarship nor predominant conceptions 
among practitioners and policymakers. Indeed, from a European perspective, the 
added value of the new approach is not that it is better than economic analysis 
of law  à la Posner. The added value of the new fi eld of studies at the intersection 
of law and psychology is, fi rst and foremost, that it could help make laws more 
effective by refl ecting empirical fi ndings about human behaviour and promote 
regulatory goals while maintaining individual authority, ownership and control. 
 Another candidate name is  ‘ law and emotions ’ , which does not suffer from 
the same drawbacks as  ‘ law and psychology ’ for transatlantic labelling purposes. 
Indeed, the phrase covers a very broad fi eld of study of which behaviourally 
 45  D  Kahneman , Foreword to  S  Mullainathan and  E  Shafi r ,  Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So 
Much ( New York ,  Times Books ,  2013 )  IX . 
 46  ibid. 
 47  A  Tor ,  ‘ The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law ’ ( 2008 )  4  Haifa Law Review  237 , 
especially fn 13. 
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informed regulation would be a subset. 48 In our view, categorising the study of 
behaviourally informed regulation as a subtopic of law and emotions could bring 
the benefi t of cross-fertilising the fi eld with insights from refl ections on a vari-
ety of enquiries into how law deals with emotions (and knowledge about them). 
Provided lawyers are not afraid of it, 49 it could thus provide a useful transatlantic 
umbrella label for the interdisciplinary study attempting to incorporate more wis-
dom about human behaviour into the law. 
 D. Translating Behavioural Insights into Policy-making 
 Nudging does not need law, at least not always. For example, nudging children to 
opt for the healthy choices at the canteen only takes an informed decision of the 
manager; no legal instrument comes into play. Likewise, no legal intervention is 
needed to make cities cleaner and induce citizens to use bins more often; green 
footprint stickers on the pavement may be all it takes to reduce the costs of garbage 
collection. 50 Similarly, handing out feedback cards on recycling habits of house-
holds is enough to induce citizens to recycle more. 51 More generally, designing or 
redesigning a choice architecture does not always require a permit. 
 Law meets nudging — or nudging meets the law, depending on which angle 
one takes — in two sets of circumstances. The fi rst situation is when private enti-
ties such as companies, charities or other non-governmental entities nudge their 
consumers, employees or potential donors into desired behaviour (buying more, 
walking more, giving more). Most of this type of (private) nudging does not par-
ticularly call for regulation, but some of it might. For example, there is no reason 
to restrict the freedom of a company to design offi ce space in such a way that 
employees get more exercise during their working day or to restrict the freedom of 
charities to use vivid narratives to catch donors ’ attention. There may, however, be 
reasons to restrict the freedom of companies when they use certain behaviourally 
informed marketing strategies to increase sales. For example, should a website that 
tracks users be allowed to display a higher price for an airplane ticket each time a 
consumer checks a certain route at certain dates? Relying in this manner on the 
psychology of scarcity appears intuitively unfair. 52 Similarly, the use of pre-ticked 
boxes to sell, for example, insurance services to purchasers of an airplane tickets 
 48  For a survey, see  TA  Maroney ,  ‘ Law and Emotion :  A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field ’ 
( 2006 )  30  Law of Human Behaviour  119 . All fi elds of law where emotions are, could or should be 
 relevant are potentially concerned by law and emotion studies (including civil matter such as trusts and 
estates, property and contract, divorce and child custody). 
 49  K  Abrams and  H  Keren ,  ‘ Who ’ s Afraid of Law and the Emotions? ’ ( 1996 )  94  Minnesota Law 
Review  1998 . 
 50  See, eg  P  Renfer and  J  Tinkler ,  ‘ Designing for Nudge Effect :  How Behaviour Management Can 
Ease Public Sector ’ ( 2011 ) LSE Research Online. 
 51  ibid. 
 52  On the psychology of scarcity, see Mullainathan and Shafi r,  Scarcity (n 45). 
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may be considered an unfair exploitation of consumers ’ status quo bias. 53 While 
marketing is prevalent in a market economy, it is also common ground, at least in 
many jurisdictions, that it should be regulated. 54 In other words regulation of pri-
vate nudging is the fi rst point of contact between law and nudging. This is because 
 ‘ counter-nudging ’ typically requires the intervention of the law. 55 
 But nudging and the law meet in a second situation too. This occurs when 
public entities themselves, similarly to what private operators do, seek to nudge 
citizens into certain behaviour, such as agreeing to donate their organs. This typi-
cally requires legislation, regulation, or authorisation. While public nudging has 
attracted much attention (and criticism), both regulation of private nudging and 
public nudging itself constitute instances of behaviourally informed regulation 
and both should be considered when exploring the interplay of behavioural sci-
ences and the law. As will be illustrated below in more detail, they both form part 
of public nudging and — as such — they can be distinguished from private nudging. 
 To further analyse the legal applications of behavioural insights, it is necessary 
to explore correspondence between the native categories used to describe nudges 
(with no particular attention to law) and legal categories. Thaler, Sunstein and 
others have invented tools — or simply, but powerfully, named them. What law-
yers need to do is to analyse them in light of legal rules and principles in order 
to determine more precisely what legal uses of behavioural insights are possible 
within existing legal orders. Of course, another discussion needs to be conducted 
in parallel to assess the legitimacy of public nudging or, as the case may be, the 
legitimacy of public intervention to regulate private nudging. Legitimacy concerns 
are more frequently raised in the fi rst case but may also arise in the second. In any 
event, it is only when they can be addressed that the enquiry into how to place 
behavioural tools in the legal toolbox will matter in practice. 
 i. Toolbox, Drawers and Tools 
 Lawyers are starting to familiarise themselves with tools that can bring behav-
ioural insights to bear. These tools do not come with legal labels on them and legal 
 53  Such is the assessment of the EU legislator:  Directive  2011/83/EU on consumer rights [ 2011 ] 
 OJ L304/64 , art 22 . 
 54  See, eg  O  Bartlett and  A  Garde ,  ‘ Time to Seize the (Red) Bull by the Horns :  The EU ’ s Failure to 
Protect Children from Alcohol and Unhealthy Food Marketing ’ ( 2013 )  38  EL Rev  498 . 
 55  Robert Baldwin uses the phrase  ‘ counter nudging ’ in a different though not unrelated sense. 
 Baldwin (n 10) 842. He calls counter-nudging the possible reaction of uncooperative regulated busi-
nesses who are compelled by regulation to nudge consumers in a certain way that runs contrary to 
corporate interests (eg when shops are mandated on pain of sanctions to check young consumer ’ s ID 
before sellling alcohol). The idea is essentially the same, namely the succession of action and  reaction 
between businesses and government. In our acception, the starting point is the pre-regulatory state: 
absent any regulation, businesses nudge consumers unhindered. In this perspective, regulation of 
 private nudging practices constitutes counter-nudging. Baldwin ’ s starting point is a regulation com-
pelling businesses to enforce a nudge. His  ‘ counter nudging ’ amounts to creative compliance in the 
specifi c context of mandated nudging. 
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scholars are increasingly wondering whether and how these tools could fi t in the 
existing regulatory toolbox(es). To this effect, several taxonomies aimed at clarify-
ing the nature of behaviourally informed intervention have been proposed. They 
constitute different ways to organise the regulatory toolbox in drawers. 
 Jolls and Sunstein have initially described  ‘ debiasing through law ’ as one of three 
possible responses to systematic errors of judgement, the two other being, respec-
tively, doing nothing and what they call  ‘ insulating strategies ’ . This last term refers 
to tools that seek to insulate outcomes from the choices that people make, for 
example by raising liability standards applicable to producers based on the notion 
that people systematically underestimate risks. 56  ‘ Debiasing ’ is distinguished from 
 ‘ insulating strategies ’ in that it seeks to correct identifi ed systematic errors rather 
than to adapt the rules to the persisting prevalence of errors in order to avoid 
their harmful consequences. While the aim of insulating strategies is to mitigate 
the consequences of errors, that of debiasing is to reduce the occurrence of errors. 
Another typology that aims at placing (public or private) behavioural interven-
tions into a broader picture distinguishes tools that structure choice architecture 
from mandates and incentives. 57 Calo, for his part, distinguishes nudges both from 
codes (or architectures) and from notices, but admits that the categories overlap 
and suggests instead that the real distinction is between facilitation and friction, 
that is policy intervention that aims at making some behaviour either easier or 
more diffi cult. 58 Other typologies focus on a fi ner level of detail. In this vein, 
Baldwin distinguishes three degrees of nudges, depending on their impact on 
individual autonomy. 59 More detailed still, and with a practical outlook rather 
than theoretical ambition, Sunstein proposes a typology of 10 types of  behavioural 
intervention. 60 
 The production of taxonomies — a thriving line of business in academia — will 
probably go on for some time. This is all the more likely given that, besides fi rst 
order categorisation issues (what drawers do we need to organise the toolbox?), 
there are also second order issues (do we need more than one toolbox?). For exam-
ple, it is not entirely clear at this stage whether one should think of nudges (one 
particular kind of behaviourally informed regulatory tools) as belonging to the 
same or a different box from other legal tools. 61 In other words, if a behavioural 
scientist comes with her toolbox to play with a lawyer, spreads out her tools on 
the fl oor, how does the lawyer organise them in his own box? Can he do this sat-
isfactorily without modifying the drawers his box comes with or does he need to 
build a new toolbox with drawers of a different shape? To make progress on these 
 56  Jolls and Sunstein (n 10) 200. 
 57  C  Sunstein and  L  Reisch ,  ‘ Redesigning Cockpits ’ ( 2014 )  37  Journal of Consumer Policy  333 . 
 58  R  Calo ,  ‘ Code, Nudge or Notice? ’ ( 2014 )  99  Iowa Law Review  773 available at papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2217013. 
 59  Baldwin (n 10). 
 60  CR  Sunstein ,  ‘ Nudging :  A Very Short Guide ’ ( 2014 )  37  Journal of Consumer Policy  583 . 
 61  Baldwin (n 10) argues in favour of a separation of toolboxes because nudges rest on principles 
that, according to him, confl ict which those that underpin classical instruments found in the regulatory 
toolbox (855 et seq). 
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questions, what is needed in our view is a tighter link between categories used to 
describe behavioural tools and legal categories, that is the categories on which 
legislation and adjudication operate. 
 ii. What the Law Can Do with Tools 
 To start with this multiple toolboxes problem, we will stick to a simple catego-
risation of behavioural tools proposed by Cass Sunstein, both as a scholar 62 and 
as a government offi cial. 63 It comprises three types of tools: (a) smart disclosure 
requirements, (b) default rules, and (c) simplifi cation. For each category of tools, 
we discuss possible correspondence with legal techniques (or drawers of the 
 second box). It is possible that one kind of tool can be operationalised with more 
than one legal technique and, conversely, that several different behavioural tools 
will call for the same legal techniques to implement them (when law is needed at 
all to implement them in a given context). 
 a. Smart Disclosure Requirements 
 The confrontation between behavioural insights and existing rules on disclosure 
leads to a simple conclusion: disclosure requirements are both prevalent in legal 
systems and remarkably ineffective. 64 Behavioural research helps explain why and 
offers leads to design different disclosure requirements, based on an understanding 
of how people process and use information. A behaviourally informed disclosure 
requirement is  ‘ smart ’ when its design ensures that disclosure is not merely tech-
nical but also meaningful, 65 useful, 66 and adequate in the given context, taking 
into account available processing capacities. 67 The potential impact of behavioural 
research for rules on disclosure is colossal. Its importance for EU law cannot be 
exaggerated since EU regulations contain a vast number of disclosure requirements 
that are not behaviourally informed. 68 Yet, from the point of view of legal tech-
nique, the incorporation of behavioural wisdom into information  requirements 
 62  Sunstein (n 13). 
 63  Executive Order 13563,  ‘ Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review ’ . 
 64  Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (n 21); Ben Shahar and Schneider (n 21); Calo (n 56);  A  Fung , 
 M  Graham , and  D  Weil ,  Full Disclosure:  The Perils and Promise of Transparency ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2007 )  5 – 6 . 
 65  A number of gigabytes in a mobile internet plan, eg does not mean much to most consumers. In 
contrast, a number of kilometres per litre of fuel is a meaningful way to describe a car ’ s fuel consump-
tion (more meaningful than litres per kilometre). 
 66  Information about the size of a handbag (preferably a picture that allows someone to visualise 
the bag and compare it to body size rather than exact measurements) is useful to consumer shopping 
online. Information about jurisdiction on the sales contract is not useful to the consumer, fi rst of all 
because it is very unlikely that she will sue the seller, whatever mishaps may occur in the  transaction and 
second because, at least if she is domiciled in an EU country, the courts of her country of  residence will 
have jurisdiction (art 18 of  Regulation  1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and  enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [ 2012 ]  OJ L351/1 . 
 67  Terms and conditions running to dozens of pages do not correspond to the level of attention a 
consumer can reasonably be expected to deploy before buying a song online. 
 68  See  ch 9 by AL Sibony and G Helleringer. 
14 Anne-Lise Sibony and Alberto Alemanno
would not require a major change. It is the content of mandated disclosure that 
needs to change, not the technique itself. 69 Indeed, this change is underway. Several 
examples of smarter disclosure requirements can be found in EU legislation in the 
area of tobacco, 70 food labelling 71 , and fi nancial products. 72 The radical version of 
the behavioural critique of disclosure requirements would lead to repeal many of 
them and to revamp others in order for the information to be tailored to the needs 
of intermediaries rather than consumers. 73 While this would be a major overhaul 
affecting a vast number of legislative and regulatory acts in the EU — just like in the 
US — the legal techniques involved would not be new in any way. Behavioural sug-
gestions translate as either repeal of existing regulation or changes in the content 
of mandates, two courses of action for which the existing legal toolbox suffi ces. 
 b. Default Rules 
 Defaults are a tool of choice in the behavioural toolbox. By operationalising the 
power of inertia and procrastination, they induce individuals towards a prede-
termined choice. Defaults, as such, are not foreign to lawyers; they have long 
existed across various fi elds of law. For example, when administrative law deter-
mines that, under the so-called  ‘ positive silence rule ’ , inertia of public authorities is 
 presumptively considered indicative that the administration approves of a certain 
behaviour, it sets approval as a default. 74 Default rules have also been prevalent 
 69  This less than revolutionary nature of smart disclosure requirement is what makes Ben-Shahar 
and Schneider sceptical of their potential to truly improve consumer protection (n 21). 
 70  Art 10 of  Directive  2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products [ 2014 ]  OJ L127/1 
requires the display of a combined warning (graphic and pictorial) occupying 65% of the two main 
surfaces of the pack . 
 71  Recital 41 of Regulation (EU)  1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers [ 2011 ]  OJ L304/18 , says that  ‘ to 
appeal to the average consumer and to serve the informative purpose for which it is introduced, and 
given the current level of knowledge on the subject of nutrition, the nutrition information provided 
should be simple and easily understood ’ . This translates into a requirement — foreseen in Arts 9 and 
13 — to provide a set of major information, such as the name of the food, the net quantity and the 
nutritional content, in the principle fi eld of vision, ie that which is most likely to be seen at fi rst glance 
by the consumer at the time of purchase and that enables the consumer to immediately identify a 
product in terms of its character or nature and, if applicable, its brand name. 
 72  See, eg  Commission Regulation  583/2010 of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive  2009/65/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards key investor information and conditions 
which must be met when providing key investor information or the prospectus in a durable medium 
other than paper or by means of a website [ 2010 ]  OJ L176/1 , which requires that the provision of the 
most relevant information for aspiring investors be disclosed in accessible terms (rather than merely 
 imposing the disclosure of all relevant information (as a prospectus would do). 
 73  Ben-Shahar and Schneider (2014) (n 21), envisage advice by intermediaries as a substitute rather 
than a complement to mandated disclosure (190). We take a less radical view on this issue. 
 74  Several countries recognise some forms of  ‘ silence equals consent ’ . However, it must be said that 
the reason of the creation of this  fi ctio juris has probably more to do with the recognised failure of 
public authorities to respect the time limits laid down in the relevant procedures than with a reasoned 
endorsement of the fi ndings of behavioural sciences. 
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in contract law, procedural law and private international law. Rules determining 
which court has jurisdiction over a contract when parties have not specifi ed it are 
a case in point. 
 Given their huge potential for affecting outcomes, default rules, may  complement 
or provide an alternative to more traditional regulatory options such as restric-
tions or bans. 75 A classic example of the use of default in policy-making is when 
legislation provides that, unless a person explicitly objects, her consent to donate 
her organs will be presumed. 
 What the behavioural perspective brings to the existing use of defaults in the 
legal system is a degree of awareness and deliberation about the power and weak-
ness of defaults. The power of defaults is the fi rst message of behavioural sciences 
and has been hailed in  Nudge . More recently however, behavioural analysis has 
drawn attention to the weaknesses of defaults in two types of situations. First, 
when the target group is too diverse and the domain is familiar, mandating active 
choices (ie requiring individuals to express their choice) might be a more sensible 
option than default rules. 76 Second, when powerful corporate actors have incen-
tives to nudge consumers to opt out of the default set by law, these defaults become 
slippery. 77 For example if the mandated default option for bank account is  ‘ no 
overdraft ’ , banks will make sure that consumers opt out of the default by includ-
ing an appropriate form in the stack consumers have to sign when they open an 
account. In such settings, mandating informed consent may not be of much help 
in practice. 78 
 EU law has recently drawn on some but not all of these ideas and warnings. For 
example, it was with full knowledge of the behavioural evidence on the power of 
defaults that the European Commission introduced a prohibition of pre-ticked 
boxes on e-commerce websites. 79 The more complex message about slippery 
defaults, and the ensuing invitation to take behavioural wisdom into account also 
at the stage of anticipating corporate strategies in reaction to legal defaults, 80 is 
yet to be accepted. This is not surprising since we are still in the early days of 
 regulating defaults in the fi eld of consumer protection. 
 Like rules on disclosures, the legal rules pertaining to defaults are not of a spe-
cial nature. They consist in legal presumptions (of administrative approval), rules 
 75  See, eg  E  Johnson et al,  ‘ Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions ’ ( 1993 )  7 ( 1 ) 
 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty  35 . 
 76  G  Carroll et al,  ‘ Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions ’ ( 2005 )  NBER Working Paper ; C Sunstein, 
 ‘ Impersonal Default Rules vs Active Choices vs Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych ’ available at 
ssrn.com/abstract=2171343.  ‘ Forced choice ’ constitutes another alternative technique.  G  Liebig and 
 J  Rommel ,  ‘ Active and Forced Choice for Overcoming Status Quo Bias :  A Field Experiment on the 
 Adoption of  “ No junk mail ” Stickers in Berlin, Germany ’ ( 2014 )  37  Journal of Consumer Policy  427 . 
 77  Wllis,  ‘ Slippery defaults ’ (n 14). 
 78  Ben-Shahar and Schneider (n 21) 192. 
 79  DG Sanco (n 513) — presented this provision in the Directive as a product of its  investigations on 
the teachings of behavioural sciences. See ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/behavioural_
research/index_en.html. 
 80  What Baldwin (n 10) calls counter-nudging strategies. 
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that lawyers themselves call default rules (eg in private international law), prohi-
bitions (addressed to corporations about defaults they may or may not set), and 
mandates addressed to administrations or corporations (to prompt active choice). 
More rarely, the law on defaults takes the form of a delegation: for example, the 
new Belgian rules on class actions do not express a legislative choice between opt-
in and opt-out; they provide that the court will decide on a case-by-case basis 
under what rule the class should be constituted. 81 Even in this example, however, 
the legal technique is not original at all: the legislator empowers the court to decide 
on an issue, which happens to be related to defaults. 
 c. Simplifi cation 
 Simplifi cation is a third category of behaviourally savvy intervention. Indeed  ‘ sim-
plify ’ it is a general behavioural mantra. As Thaler and Sunstein put it, if you want 
people to do something, make it simple. 82 Simplifi cation carries the potential to 
promote regulatory goals, by easing participation and providing clearer messages 
to targeted groups about what they are expected to do. 83 The implementation of 
simplifi cation measures typically requires a careful observation and direct ques-
tioning and understanding of the behaviour of the relevant actors. Simplifi cation 
is often operationalised through design-driven solutions. 84 
 From a legal standpoint, simplifi cation typically involves low-level legal instru-
ments, such as administrative guidance documents requiring forms to be short-
ened and some information made more salient, offi cial letters to be written in 
plain language, and red tape cut. Reductions of compliance costs and administra-
tive costs can also be achieved by promoting exchange between administrations in 
order to avoid duplicating administrative burden for regulatees. In the EU context, 
this strategy is often implemented by a requirement addressed to Member States 
to interconnect administrative authorities in order to facilitate compliance with 
national rules for businesses and professionals based in other Member States. 85 
 On a cursory view, based on a simple and purpose-oriented categorisation 
of policy use of behavioural insights, it appears that there is not always a clear 
 81  ArtXVII. 43.  § 2, 3 ° Economic Code (in force since 1 September 2014) inserted by Law of 
28 March 2014,  Moniteur Belge , 29 April 2014, C-2014/11217, 35204. 
 82  Thaler and Sunstein,  Nudge (n 1). 
 83  See, eg  S  Mullainathan ,  WJ  Congdon , and  JR  Kling ,  Policy and Choice:  Public Finance through the 
Lens of Behavioral Economics ( Washington DC ,  Brookings Institution Press ,  2011 ) . 
 84  The work performed by Katrin Brems Olsen at the Danish Business Authority is particularly 
pioneering in this regard. See,  ‘ The Vision of the Danish Design Committee 2020 ’ available at 
danishbusinessauthority.dk/fi le/301679/vision-danish-design-2020.pdf. 
 85  See, eg  Directive  2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market [ 2006 ]  OJ L376/36 . Art 6 provides for the setting up of points of 
single contact, whose function is to simplify compliance for businesses: ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
eu-go/index_en.htm. More generally, the Internal Market Information System (IMI) enables national 
administrative bodies to obtain information in their own language from their counterpart from 
other Member States on a variety of regulatory issues such as recognition of diplomas: ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/imi-net/index_en.htm. 
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 correspondence between types of behavioural intervention and legal techniques 
and little need for novel legal categories. Smart disclosures can be implemented by 
command and control regulation whose content is smarter than is still often the 
case. From a technical legal standpoint, what matters is whether disclosure is man-
dated or not. A behavioural perspective contributes to more effective streamlining 
of what information must be disclosed and draws attention to the importance 
of regulating how it must be disclosed but none of this calls for novel legal tools. 
Smart disclosure can fi t into the mandates drawer. Behavioural insights about 
defaults may have more than one legal translation, essentially substantive rules 
setting a default — as in the case of organ donation — and procedural rules deter-
mining who is to set a default and how. 86 Again, behavioural insights give food for 
thought about the content of rules and do not call for new types of legal instru-
ments. Simplifi cation corresponds in the legal sphere to an array of administra-
tive practices, which may be regulated by more or less formalised guidance (from 
guidelines internal to an administration to an EU Directive setting up a network 
of administrations), but again no novel regulatory technique. Law is and remains 
low tech 87 and genuine policy innovations such as behaviourally informed public 
intervention do not translate in a reconstruction of the legal toolbox. This does not 
mean that the law already does a good job from a behavioural standpoint, only that 
it is largely by choosing and using existing legal tools differently that the law can 
do a better job. A caveat concerns techniques for making defaults stick where they 
can be expected to be vulnerable to corporate strategies. As previously observed, 
existing legal techniques, at least as currently used, seem ill suited to tackle that 
problem effectively and legal creativity in this fi eld would be very desirable. 
 iii. Regulatory Contexts 
 In addition to a classifi cation of tools, it is useful to distinguish between regula-
tory contexts. While we do not purport to have a complete typology of relevant 
attributes of regulatory contexts, we would like to highlight two dimensions that 
deserve further attention. 88 
 86  An example is the new Belgian Law on Class Actions. The system it institutes for constituting a 
class is neither opt-in nor opt-out. Rather, the statute provides that it is for the court to determine on 
a case-by-case basis whether the class will be constituted on an opt-in or opt-out basis. ArtXVII. 43. 
 § 2, 3 ° Economic Code (in force since 1 September 2014) inserted by Law of 28 March 2014,  Moniteur 
Belge , 29 April 2014, C-2014/11217, 35204. 
 87  AL  Sibony ,  ‘ Can EU Consumer Law Benefi t from Behavioural Insights? An Analysis of the 
Unfair Practices Directive ’ in  K  Mathis (ed),  European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics 
 ( Heidelberg ,  Springer ,  2015 ) para 5.1.6. 
 88  A third important dimension, that we do not explore here, is individual differences in the popula-
tion targeted by regulation. Heterogeneity with regard to one bias may not be a problem when law only 
seeks to debias those that do suffer from a bias (Jolls and Sunstein (n 10) 229), but that is not the case of 
all behaviourally informed regulation. For an early discussion of distributive concerns with debiasing 
measures, see  C  Camerer et al,  ‘ Regulation for Conservatives :  Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
 “ Asymmetric Paternalism ” ’ ( 2003 )  151  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  1211, 1211 – 12 . On indi-
vidual differences, see further  A  Tor ,  ‘ Understanding Behavioral Antitrust ’ ( 2014 )  92  Texas Law Review 
 573 , 608 et seq; A Tor,  ‘ Law for a Behaviorally-Complex World ’ unpublished manuscript. 
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 The fi rst is the policy impetus behind a policy. In this regard, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between two perspectives already mentioned above: the fi rst is that of a 
public authority which seeks to steer behaviour in the public interest, taking into 
account one or more existing bias(es) (eg default enrolment for organ donation 
takes into account inertia bias). We call this pure public nudging. The second per-
spective is where public authorities react to exploitation of biases by market forces 
by regulating private nudging. We call this  ‘ counter-nudging ’ . Pure public nudg-
ing is characterised by the intention to either help people correct errors they may 
be subject to (this is the perspective of debiasing through law) regardless of their 
exploitative use by market forces or to alter their preferences. The public author-
ity is the initiator and the architect of nudges and citizens are nudged. While pure 
public nudging never happens in a vacuum and there is always a context to the 
decisions people make, the perspective is nevertheless somewhat different where 
public intervention primarily aims at countering active corporate strategies to 
nudge consumers. In the latter case, the context of decisions has been engeneered 
to serve business interests and public authorities step in to regulate the corporate 
activity of context shaping. In such situations, public intervention does not only 
seek to correct a bias that (some) people may have; it seeks to counter active cor-
porate exploitation of such biases. In the behavioural law jargon, which builds on 
the terminology of law and economics, counter-nudging is said to be justifi ed by 
the existence of a  ‘ behavioural market failure ’ , 89 a  ‘ fourth type of market failure ’ . 90 
A case in point is the prohibition of pre-ticked boxes  previously  mentioned. 91 In 
this example, the commonly-used commercial strategy of pre-ticking boxes is 
designed to leverage inertia bias. Legislation prohibiting pre-ticked boxes directly 
aims at avoiding this form of exploitation of inertia bias and  constitutes an 
 example of counter-nudging. 
 The distinction between pure public nudging and counter-nudging, while pos-
sibly not absolute, seems helpful on two counts. First, when discussing legitimacy 
concerns about behavioural public intervention, it makes sense to reserve a dif-
ferent treatment to  ‘ pure ’ government infl uence on people on the one hand and 
to government regulation of private infl uence on the other. These two strands 
of nudging may resort to the same regulatory techniques, but, from a normative 
point of view, should not be held to the same standard of scrutiny. One reason is 
because they are supported by different justifi cations and, consequently, raise dif-
ferent objections. Where consumers are confronted with avoidable framing effect, 
such as those abusively used by market operators to boost sales, it is possible to 
make a case for intervention not only on welfare grounds (people are better off 
 89  O  Bar-Gill ,  Seduction by Contract, Law Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets ( Oxford , 
 Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) . 
 90  M  Bennet et al,  What Behavioural Economics Means for Competition Policy ( UK Offi ce of Fair 
Trading , March  2010 )  2 . The fi rst three types of market failures, which classically justify public 
intervention, are: information asymetry, externalities and public goods. However, there are richer 
classifi cations of market failures (including market power, missing markets, incomplete markets and 
inequalities). 
 91  See n 53. 
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drinking less soda) but also in the name of autonomy. Autonomy is about letting 
people choose in a meaningful manner. In our view, taking choice seriously is not 
only about formal freedom of choice between options whose features, number 
and complexity are designed by private operators in their commercial interest. 
Streamlining choice can help make choice more mindful and more meaning-
ful. As is now well known, too much choice makes people unhappy. 92 We do not 
deny that a certain idea of welfare comes into play at the stage of deciding how 
to streamline individual choices. Our point is that there is another dimension to 
the discussion, one that could appeal to those who promote choice as a value. 93 
Where, by contrast, public intervention does not seek to compensate for some 
private infl uence on choice, the rationale is only to enhance welfare. There will of 
course be disagrements about the legitimacy of behavioural intervention depend-
ing on value jugdements and the weight attributed respectively to autonomy and 
to welfare. Our point is only to say that disagreements can be usefully articulated 
using the distinction between pure public nudging and regulation of private 
nudging In our view, pure public nudging, which can only be justifi ed on welfare 
arguments and not on choice arguments, should be subject to a stricter scrutiny 
than counter-nudging. 94 
 Second, pure public nudging and counter-nudging may well call for different 
uses of behavioural insights in law-making. While pure public nudging can be 
implemented through administrative practices and does not always require legis-
lation, regulation of private nudging, even when behaviourally informed, tends to 
take the form of classic command and control rules. This suggests that considera-
tion of behavioural insights in policy-making and, in particular, rule design may 
take different forms according to the regulatory context but also to the regulatory 
intent. It is the aim pursued by the action — attempting to neutralise a bias or 
countering its exploitative use by the market — that determines the legal treatment 
of the behaviourally inspired intervention. Another dimension of regulatory con-
text that calls further exploration is the position of possibly biased actors in the 
regulatory process. These actors include in particular experts — who play a key role 
in EU regulation 95 — policymakers themselves, 96 and may also involve judges. 97 
 92  B  Schwarz ,  The Paradox of Choice:  Why More is Less ( New York ,  Harper Perennial ,  2004 ) . 
 93  In a different context (that of global antitrust), see  NW  Averitt and  RH  Lande ,  ‘ Using the  “ Con-
sumer Choice ” Approach to Antitrust Law ’ ( 2007 )  74  Antitrust Law Journal  175 ;  RH  Lande ,  ‘ Consumer 
Choice as the Best Way to Recenter the Mission of Competition Law ’ in  Academic Society for Com-
petition Law ,  Common Ground for International Competition Law ( Edward Elgar ,  2010 ) ;  P  Nihoul , 
 ‘ Freedom of Choice :  The Emergence of a Powerful Concept in European Competition Law ’ ( 2012 )  3 
(48103)  Revue Concurrences  55 . 
 94  On this issue (not this distinction), see in this volume  ch 4 by A van Aaken,  ‘ Judge the Nudge: In 
Search of the Legal Limits of Paternalistic Nudging in the EU ’ . 
 95  See in this volume  ch 5 by O Perez,  ‘ Can Experts be Trusted and what Can be Done About It? 
Insights from the Biases and Heuristics Literature ’ . 
 96  See in this volume  ch 6  ‘ Overcoming Illusions of Control: How to Nudge and Teach Regulatory 
Humility ’ by CA Dunlop and C Radaelli. 
 97  To our knowledge, no study has been conducted with EU judges or national judges in the context 
of applying EU Law. However, research conducted in the US almost surely would prove relevant as the 
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 II. A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
 To date, most scholarly discussions about behaviourally informed intervention 
are either set in either a US or a UK context or framed in general terms, so that 
they have global relevance. The European Union (EU) is scarcely mentioned 
at all. 98 In fact, Europe is doubly absent from the emerging behavioural regulation 
scene: both as a regulatory power and as a subject of study for law and behavioural 
studies. As a (mass) producer of regulation, the EU is as yet making scarce use of 
behavioural insights. Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural 
consideration (eg revised Tobacco Products Directive, 99 Consumer Information 
Regulation, 100 behavioural advertising, 101 guidance on the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, 102 occasional behavioural remedies in competition law, 103 and 
core insights are linked to psychology and not to law. See, eg  JJ  Rachlinski ,  ‘ How Judges Make Decisions ’ 
in  RWM  Giard (ed),  Judicial Decision Marking in Civil Law:  Determinants, Dynamics and  Delusions 
( The Hague ,  Eleven International Publishing ,  2012 )  87 ;  JJ  Rachlinski ,  AJ  Wistrich , and  C  Guthrie , 
 ‘ Probability, Probable Cause, and the Hindsight Bias ’ ( 2011 )  8  Journal of Empirical Legal  Studies  72 . 
 98  When Europe is mentioned, this reference generally boils down to a tribute to the UK ’ s pioneer-
ing experience with the Behavioural Insights Team. For a cursory mention of European energy labels, 
see Sunstein and Reisch (n 57) and  M  Vandebergh ,  A  Carrico , and  L  Schultz ,  ‘ Regulation in the Behav-
ioral Era ’ ( 2011 )  95  Minnesota Law Review  715 . For an exploration in the specifi c EU context and on a 
core issue of EU law, see  JU  Franck and  K  Purnhagen ,  ‘ Homo Economicus, Behavioural Sciences, and 
Economic Regulation :  On the Concept of Man in Internal Market Regulation and its Normative Basis ’ 
in  K  Mathis (ed),  Law and Economics in Europe:  Foundations and Applications ( Dordrecht ,  Springer , 
 2014 )  329 . 
 99  In particular Art 9 of  Directive  2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products [ 2014 ]  OJ 
L127/1 , requires each unit pack and outside packaging of tobacco products to carry general warnings 
covering 50% of the lateral surfaces (rendered fully visible and salient by a black frame). Moreover, 
Art10 requires the display of a combined warning (graphic and pictorial) occupying 65% of the two 
main surfaces of the pack. See  A  Alemanno ,  ‘ Nudging Smokers :  The Behavioural Turn of Tobacco 
Risk Regulation ’ ( 2012 )  European Journal of Risk Regulation  32 ;  A  Alemanno ,  ‘ Out of Sight Out of 
Mind :  Towards a New European Tobacco Products Directive ’ ( 2012 )  18  Columbia Journal of European 
Law  197 . 
 100  While falling short of requiring a  ‘ front of the pack ’ display, the EU Food Information Regula-
tion also requires that the information be legible and presented per 100ml or per 100g. See  Regulation 
 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers [ 2011 ]  OJ L304/18 . 
 101  See Comprehensive Standard for Online Behavioural Advertising (OBA), ec.europa.eu/justice/
news/consulting_public/0006/contributions/organisations/epc_annex2a_en.pdf. 
 102  Commission Staff Working Document,  ‘ Guidance on the Implementation/Application of 
Directive  2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices ’ SEC ( 2009 ) 1666 , ec.europa.eu/justice/
consumer-marketing/fi les/ucpd_report_en.pdf, 32. 
 103  In the  Microsoft (browser) case, the Commission imposed a choice prompt: users would see 
a pop up screen that prompted them to choose a browser from among 12 different programmes. 
The order in which the browsers appeared was randomised. Commission Decision of 16 December 
2009,  Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530). The browser choice screen can be seen at:  www.
browserchoice.eu/BrowserChoice/browserchoice_en.htm . A similar arrangement is currently at the 
centre of the negotiations between the EU Commission and Google in the framework of  investigation. 
See EU Commission Press Release,  ‘ Antitrust: EU Commission obtains from Google comparable 
display of specialised rival search engines ’ Brussels, 4 February 2014, available at europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-116_en.htm. 
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consumer rights), 104 the EU has not yet shown a general commitment to integrate 
behavioural research into policy-making. Given the potential of this regulatory 
approach to attain effective, low-cost and choice-preserving policies, such a stance 
seems inadequate, especially when measured against the EU ’ s commitment to 
smart and evidence-based regulation. 105 
 Europe is not only absent as an actor and a producer of behaviourally informed 
rules. It is also not yet an object of study for law and behavioural sciences schol-
ars, most of whom are based in the United States or in Israel. Clearly, it does not 
suffi ce that EU law is accessible in 23 languages, including English, to draw the 
interest of non-European scholars into how behavioural insights could be used 
in the specifi c EU legal context. In order to explore the European dimension and 
fi nd out whether there are any meaningful differences with other legal contexts, it 
is necessary to draw more European legal scholars to this fi eld of study and pave 
the way for a new EU-specifi c research agenda. There are several reasons why the 
endeavour is worthy of interest. 
 A. Comparisons 
 Some questions, for example  ‘ how much do we value individual choice? ’ can be 
posed in similar terms in various jurisdictions. Answers may vary, notably because 
of differences in political history, thus making comparisons interesting. This alone 
would justify taking a closer look at Europe, without assuming that US scholar-
ship is entirely relevant or could mechanically be extended to the other side of the 
Atlantic. In this regard, it is our hope that some contributions in this volume will 
provide new examples to feed existing discussions — such as the one on the legiti-
macy of public nudging. 
 Another instance of variance between the two sides of the Atlantic pertains to 
the use of the market failure language. While it is almost native English legalese in 
the US, this is not the case in all European languages and legal cultures. Importing 
that language to Europe does not seem like a good idea because fi ndings about the 
behavioural traits of humans are very different from what economists call market 
failure. Characteristics of human decision-making exist irrespective of markets 
and can be at work in a variety of non-market contexts relevant to the law. 106 
Where participants in a discussion immediately associate  ‘ market failure ’ with 
 ‘ justifi cation for intervention ’ , it can make rhetorical sense to connect behavioural 
insights to the notion of market failures despite the unduly restrictive character 
 104  In particular art 22 of  Directive  2011/83/EU on consumer rights [ 2011 ]  OJ L304/64 , which 
 prohibits the use of pre-ticked boxes on e-commerce websites . 
 105  See  European Commission,  ‘ Communication on Smart Regulation in the EU ’ COM ( 2010 )  543 
fi nal ; for a related and more recent policy espousal, see  European Commission,  ‘ Communication on 
Regulatory Fitness ’ COM( 2012 )  746 fi nal . 
 106  Chapter 2: F Di Porto and N Rangone,  ‘ Behavioural Sciences in Practice: Lessons for EU 
Rulemakers ’ . 
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of such language. In Europe, the limited usefulness of such a connection allows 
scholars to avoid a conceptual confusion. 
 B. Different Academic Landscapes 
 Other questions need to be framed differently in Europe and elsewhere, so that it 
is not the answers, but the questions themselves that can be a meaningful object of 
comparison. A case in point is the perception of behavioural insights by lawyers. 
In the US, law and economics has formed part of mainstream legal scholarship for 
several decades. Not so in Europe. 107 Standard law and economics is still greeted 
with the sort of scepticism expressed by US legal scholars in the 1980s. 108 As a 
result, behavioural studies, even if they do take hold in European legal scholarship, 
will not occupy the same space, simply because that space will not be designed in 
the same landscape. In the US, the study of interactions between law and behav-
ioural insights was quickly — and understandably, though somewhat ironically —
 termed  ‘ law and behavioural economics ’ . 109 
 The behavioural turn was — and remains — novel and exciting for lawyers because 
they had integrated the tale of  homo oeconomicus as part of a standard scholarly 
discourse. Empirical fi ndings establishing that this familiar fi gure was probably 
not a very helpful proxy for modelling human behaviour called for a revision of 
an entire body of scholarship. In academia, this justifi es excitement. In Europe, 
legal academia has, by and large, displayed a strong resistance to economic analysis 
of law, not necessarily through opposition, but through polite  marginalisation. 110 
 107  E  MacKaay ,  Law and Economics for Civil Law Systems ( Cheltenham ,  Edward Elgar ,  2013 ) . 
For an elaboration on EU/US differences in this regard, see  K  Purnhagen ,  ‘ Never the Twain Shall Meet? 
A Critical Perspective on Cultural Limits between Internal Continental Dogmatism and Consequential 
US-Style Law and Economics Theory ’ in  K  Mathis (ed),  Law and Economics in Europe — Foundations 
and Applications ( Dordrecht ,  Springer ,  2014 )  3 . 
 108  T  Ulen ,  ‘ European and American Perspectives on Behavioral Law and Economics ’ in  K  Mathis 
(ed),  European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics, Economic Analysis of Law in European 
Legal Scholarship ,  vol 2 ( Zurich ,  Springer ,  2015 )  5 , fn 4, recalling that, when he fi rst began presenting 
papers to law faculties in the early 1980s and would begin his presentation by saying that he would be 
assuming rational choice by decisionmakers, someone would usually ask some version of the question: 
 ‘ Who are these rational decisionmakers you ’ re talking about? ’ . 
 109  Section I. C. iii. above. 
 110  French legal scholarship may be taken as an example. In the relatively few books published to 
date in France on Economic analysis of law (less than 12 titles, 2 of which are translations of US books), 
the focus is usually on establishing the legitimacy and the usefulness of the economic approach both 
in general and in a particular fi eld specifi cally. French scholars who write in the fi eld in French almost 
never take it for granted that their readers will know the basic tenets of economic analysis. This is a rea-
sonable assumption since it is rarely taught in law schools. See, eg  B  Deffains ,  L ’ analyse  é conomique du 
droit dans les pays de droit civil ( Paris ,  É ditions Cujas ,  2002 ) (the fi rst edited volume in economic analy-
sis of law in France);  G  Ma î tre ,  La responsabilit é civile  à l ’ é preuve de l ’ analyse  é conomique du droit ( Paris , 
 LGDJ ,  2005 ) (fi rst French PhD in law dealing with civil liability in light of economic analysis). To date, 
the only textbook of economic analysis of law in French is the work of two authors from Quebec, 
 E  Mackaay and  S  Rousseau ,  Analyse  é conomique du droit ( Paris/Montr é al ,  Dalloz-Sirey/ É ditions 
Th é mis ,  2008 ) . A more advanced textbook,  B  Deffains and  E  Langeais ,  Analyse  é conomique du droit: 
 Principes, m é thodes ( Brussels ,  De Boeck ,  2009 ) , is clearly addressed to economics rather than to law 
students. 
A European Perspective 23
Although the situation is not uniform across countries and despite the fact that 
a number of European publications, research programmes and university chairs 
in law and economics could be named, it is nevertheless largely the case that doc-
trinal approaches dominate the legal academic scene in Europe. This means that 
behavioural insights are exciting for a signifi cantly smaller proportion of lawyers 
than in the US. And for those for whom they actually are exciting, their overall 
impact is epistemically less dramatic. Where lawyers work with an implicit rep-
resentation of human action based on common sense and intuition, empirical 
studies showing that humans do not behave like econs will still gather interest. 
Yet this is more as something any educated person will enjoy bringing to a dinner 
conversation than as the seeds of a major shift in how law is made and studied. 111 
 An additional reason why the selection from behavioural insights that could 
enrich the regulator toolbox may be different in Europe is because there is no 
expectation that lessons from psychology should take a detour via law and 
 economics — and its characteristic fi ltering devices — before reaching the policy-
making sphere. The selection of policy-relevant teachings from psychology will 
be different if it is performed by lawyers with little or no economic background 
or simply less allegiance to the economic way of framing policy questions. For 
example, in Europe, far fewer legal scholars than in the US would spontaneously 
embrace the notion that the ultimate goal of policy-making must consist in  ‘ max-
imising welfare ’ . Similarly, they would not assume that people have well defi ned 
preferences over a well-defi ned and very broad set of both product characteristics 
and social issues. This bears directly on the discussion of whether or not behav-
iourally informed regulation  ‘ manipulates ’ choices. Indeed, can choice really be 
 ‘ distorted ’ if it has not been clearly formed in the fi rst place? Why would it be 
acceptable for marketing to shape preferences but not for public intervention? 
With regards to these two questions, individual opinions vary and are usually 
affi rmed. Despite large individual variations, it is our perception that the intui-
tive baseline of the average European lawyer is more intervention-friendly than 
that of her US counterpart and that this may help explain why the debate about 
 behaviourally informed regulation will take a distinct shape in Europe. 
 The sum of these considerations underpins our endeavour to provide the  incipient 
nudge debate with a European perspective. 
 111  Ulen (n 108) explains how law is more open than economics to behavioural innovations (5). Our 
point is related but distinct: we anticipate that behavioural law will be perceived by legal scholars as 
less innovative in Europe than in the US because their baseline representation of human behaviour is 
common sense rather than economic rationality. This does not detract from Ulen ’ s point that innova-
tion in legal academia matters less in Europe than in the US because competition between law schools 
is much milder. Both point to the prediction that, although there are no epistemological obstacles to 
the penetration of behavioural insights into the sphere of law, behavioural legal studies may be slow 
to pick up in Europe because incentives are weak (scholars who engage in the pursuit of behavioural 
studies will be perceived as only moderately innovative and their degree of innovativeness affects their 
career prospects only moderately). 
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 III. STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE VOLUME 
 This volume has been structured by taking as a point of departure the current 
nudging debate, which mainly comprises two strands of enquiry: when is it legiti-
mate for states to use psychology to inform policy? (the legitimacy debate) and, to 
the extent that it is legitimate, how can behavioural insights in practice be incor-
porated into the decision-making processes? (the practicability debate). Against 
this backdrop we brought together scholars who could analyse what behavioural 
insights might bring to EU law, both at a horizontal level and at a sectoral level. 
The following chapters endeavour to present the results of their research in a 
manner that is accessible both to EU law specialists who are not yet familiar with 
behavioural sciences and to behavioural lawyers who are not specialists in EU law. 
 Part I focuses on the major challenges brought about by the progressive inte-
gration of behavioural sciences into the law by discussing in particular the issues 
of legitimacy and practicability. In chapter two, Fabiana di Porto and Nicoletta 
Rangone offer general lessons to EU policymakers on how to make use of behav-
ioural insights. Chapter three, by Murieann Quigley and Elen Stokes address the 
challenges of evidence-based policy both from a normative and and from an effi -
ciency standpoint. In chapter four, Anne van Aacken offers a critical perspective 
on behaviourally informed intervention. She does so by focusing on the inability 
of such intervention to satisfy the proportionality requirement, which under EU 
law applies in a variety of contexts to both EU and national measures. 
 Part II discusses the potential of behavioural sciences, once integrated in the 
policy process, to debias not only the citizens but also the experts and the policy-
makers themselves. No less than ordinary people, policymakers as well as experts 
rely on heuristics and, as a result, are subject to predictable biases. 112 Experts play 
a very important role in many areas of EU policies and chapter fi ve presents the 
 ‘ debiasing projects ’ in relation to them. Oren Perez draws on the available liter-
ature and experiments to invite a refl ection on whether experts can be trusted 
and what the EU should do about it. In chapter six, Claire Dunlop and Claudio 
Radaelli take a behavioural look at regulatory impact assessment, the dominant 
analytical tool guiding EU policy-making. After providing an insightful analysis 
on the EU system of impact assessment, they warn about the illusion of control 
that can bias policymakers. 
 In Part III, our contributors predict the impact that behavioural sciences may 
have on specifi c EU policies: data protection (chapter seven by Eoin Carolan and 
Alessandro Spina and chapter eight by Frederik Borgesius), consumer protection 
(chapter nine by Genevi è ve Helleringer and Anne-Lise Sibony), health law (chap-
ter ten by Alberto Alemanno), fi nancial law (chapter eleven by Pieter Van Cleynen-
breugel). We asked our contributors to, fi rst, assess whether there was a place for 
behavioural insights in their fi eld of study. Second, in the affi rmative, to identify 
the most important reasons why behavioural sciences are relevant to their fi eld 
 112  C  Jolls and  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Debiasing through Law ’ ( 2006 )  35  Journal of Legal Studies  199, 233 . 
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of law. We fi nally asked them to consider at what stages of policy-making, or the 
implementation of rules, behavioural insights should be brought to bear. While 
it has not always been possible to answer these questions with the same degree of 
detail, the chapters in this part provide some useful elements for comparing the 
use of behavioural insights in EU regulations across policy areas. 
 Part IV provides a critical perspective on behavioural informed regulation, by 
identifying its major fl aws, and formulating a few recommendations on how to 
overcome them. In chapter twelve, P é ter Cserne addresses the growing scepticism 
surrounding the nudge discourse and discusses three major limits that may lessen 
what EU Law can learn from behavioural sciences. Last but note least, in chapter 
thirteen, Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel alert us to the existence of behavioural 
trade-offs: frequently, more than one behavioural insight may be relevant to a sin-
gle policy decision. Therefore, to avoid falling into the trap of oversimplifi cation 
when relying on behavioural insights, dealing with the resulting trade-offs appears 
as a necessity. 
 The chapters in this volume are far from speaking with one voice. Their authors 
are neither unanimously nudge enthusiasts nor nudge sceptics. What unites them 
is a common interest in understanding more about the legal and policy implica-
tions stemming from the emergence of behaviourally informed policy-making. 
Their refl ections identify many challenges that need to be addressed to allow 
policy makers, administrative authorities and courts in Europe to knowledgeably 
and responsibly use behavioural insights. In so doing, the sum of the individual 
chapters collectively reinforces our claim that the study of law and behavioural 
sciences could have a bright future in Europe. It is by relying on those contributions 
that the fi nal chapter strives to map out the future research agenda of the emerging 
behavioural informed policy-making in Europe and beyond. 
 

